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INTRODUCTION
Edvard Munch, painter of “The Scream,” famously said,
“Sickness, insanity and death were the angels that
surrounded my cradle, and they have followed me
throughout my life.”1 Although Munch was referring to his
difficult childhood and his turbulent adult life, the quote
fairly depicts the experience of those with severe mental
illness who find themselves enmeshed in the criminal justice
† Associate Judge of the New York State Court of Appeals. This Article was
derived from a presentation given at the Charles E. Steinberg Lecture in
Psychiatry and the Law at the University of Rochester Medical Center in
September 2018. I would like to thank Dr. Robert L. Weisman and Dr. J. Richard
Ciccone from the University of Rochester for their assistance and feedback on
that presentation. All views expressed herein are my own and not reflective of
the positions or opinions of the Court or its members.
†† Senior Principal Law Clerk to the Hon. Eugene M. Fahey.
††† J.D. Candidate 2020, Cornell Law School; B.S. 2017, St. Thomas Aquinas
College.
1. Edvard Munch, NEW WORLD ENCYCLOPEDIA, http://www.newworld
encyclopedia.org/entry/Edvard_Munch (last visited April 15, 2020).
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system. Some of these individuals plead not guilty by reason
of insanity.2
During my time as an Associate Judge on New York’s
Court of Appeals, I visited maximum security prisons
throughout the state. Frequently, I would ask what
percentage of inmates in the facility were being treated for
mental health disorders. Invariably, the anecdotal figures I
received was that approximately fifty percent of inmates are
being treated for some form of mental health problem, and
that approximately ten percent have a serious mental
disorder. Thus far, I have visited thirteen of New York’s
maximum-security prisons.
Reality vs. Perception
Charles Ewing—a professor at University at Buffalo
Law School, prominent forensic psychologist, and expert on
this subject—says that he tells his students, “you have to be
crazy to plead insanity.”3 This is because the insanity defense
is rarely used, and even more rarely successful. It may result
in lifetime confinement in a secure psychiatric facility, even
when it is successful.4 Studies indicate that nationally, fewer
than one percent of criminal cases involve an insanity
defense, and of those cases, the defense succeeds in fewer
than a quarter of them.5 Nationally, when the insanity
defense is disputed at trial, “only an estimated one-120th of
[one] percent of contested felony cases” end in a successful
2. The average trial judge seldom sees an insanity case given the rarity of
the defense. Trial judges more often deal with competency proceedings under
Criminal Procedure Law article 730 in criminal cases. In civil cases, trial judges
are likely to see proceedings for appointment of a guardian for those with
incapacities under Mental Hygiene Law article 81, hospitalization of the
mentally ill pursuant to Mental Hygiene Law article 9, or the civil commitment
of sex offenders under Mental Hygiene Law article 10. Those proceedings are
beyond the scope of this Article.
3. CHARLES PATRICK EWING, INSANITY: MURDER, MADNESS,
(2008).
4. See generally id. at xxii–xxiv.
5. Id. at xxii.
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insanity defense.6 The vast majority of insanity acquittals
result from a plea agreement, where the prosecution
concedes that the defendant meets the requirements for the
insanity defense,7 rather than after a trial where the defense
is disputed.
In the State of New York, of approximately five thousand
murder cases between 2007 and 2016, just six ended with the
defendant found not responsible by reason of mental disease
or defect; the state does not track how often the defense is
raised.8 Between 2013 and 2017, only eleven defendants out
of 19,041 felony and misdemeanor trials conducted in the
state were found not responsible by reason of mental disease
or defect pursuant to Penal Law § 40.15, and 241 defendants
entered an insanity plea out of 1,375,096 convictions during
the same time period.9 As of June 30, 2018, 260 insanity
acquittees were receiving treatment in secure confinement
and another 452 insanity acquittees “were in the community
subject to orders of conditions.”10
Despite this evidence to the contrary, the public is
persistent in its belief that insanity is a loophole that sane
defendants frequently fake in order to escape punishment.11
The public overestimates how often the insanity defense is

6. Mac McClelland, When “Not Guilty” Is a Life Sentence, N.Y. TIMES (Sept.
27, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/27/magazine/when-not-guilty-is-alife-sentence.html.
7. GARY B. MELTON ET AL., PSYCHOLOGICAL EVALUATIONS FOR THE COURTS: A
HANDBOOK FOR MENTAL HEALTH PROFESSIONALS AND LAWYERS 188 (2d ed. 1997).
8. James C. McKinley Jr. & Jan Ransom, Nanny Faces Tough Insanity Test:
Did She Know Killing Was Wrong?, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 27, 2018), https://www.
nytimes.com/2018/03/27/nyregion/nanny-murder-trial-insanity-defense.html; see
also Russ Buettner, Mentally Ill, But Insanity Plea Is Long Shot, N.Y. TIMES (Apr.
3, 2013), https://www.nytimes.com/2013/04/04/nyregion/mental-illness-is-no-gua
rantee-insanity-defense-will-work-for-tarloff.html.
9. Christopher Liberati-Conant & Sheila E. Shea, ‘You Have to Be Crazy to
Plead Insanity’: How an Acquittal Can Lead to Lifetime Confinement, 91 N.Y.
STATE B. ASS’N J. 28, 30 (2019).
10. Id. at 30–31.
11. EWING, supra note 3, at xxii.
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raised and how successful it is.12 In addition, although media
reports often equate mental illness with violent behavior,
individuals with mental illness are overall more likely to be
victims of violence than perpetrators.13
The Essential New York Statutes
Penal Law § 40.15 provides New York’s definition of the
insanity defense, which New York formally refers to as “lack
of criminal responsibility by reason of mental disease or
defect.” Penal Law § 40.15 states:
In any prosecution for an offense, it is an affirmative defense that
when the defendant engaged in the proscribed conduct, he lacked
criminal responsibility by reason of mental disease or defect. Such
lack of criminal responsibility means that at the time of such
conduct, as a result of mental disease or defect, he lacked
substantial capacity to know or appreciate either: (1) The nature
and consequences of such conduct; or (2) That such conduct was
wrong.14

Insanity is an affirmative defense in New York, which
means that the defendant bears the burden of proving that
he or she was insane at the time of the crime by a
preponderance of the evidence.15 This essentially means that
the evidence the defendant presents tending to establish that
he or she was insane at the time of the crime must outweigh
the evidence presented by the prosecution to the contrary.16
12. See MELTON ET AL., supra note 7, at 187–88; MICHAEL L. PERLIN &
HEATHER ELLIS CUCOLO, MENTAL DISABILITY LAW: CIVIL AND CRIMINAL § 14-3.2 (3d
ed. 2017); Natalie Jacewicz, After Hinckley, States Tightened Use of The Insanity
Plea, NPR (July 28, 2016), https://www.npr.org/sections/health-shots/2016/07/28/
486607183/after-hinckley-states-tightened-use-of-the-insanity-plea.
13. A.B.A. DEATH PENALTY DUE PROCESS REV. PROJECT, SEVERE MENTAL
ILLNESS AND THE DEATH PENALTY 17–18 (2016), https://www.americanbar.org/con
tent/dam/aba/images/crsj/DPDPRP/SevereMentalIllnessandtheDeathPenalty_W
hitePaper.pdf.
14. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 40.15 (McKinney 2019).
15. PENAL § 25.00(2).
16. Insanity (Lack of Criminal Responsibility By Reason of Mental Disease or
Defect) Penal Law § 40.15, in N.Y. STATE UNIFIED COURT SYSTEM, C.J.I.2D[NY]
INSTRUCTIONS OF GENERAL APPLICABILITY 2 (last updated Nov. 27, 2019),
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It is a lower standard than proof beyond a reasonable doubt.
Criminal Procedure Law [hereinafter “CPL”] § 250.10
contains important procedural provisions relevant to the
insanity defense. It provides that whenever the defense
intends to present psychiatric evidence of a mental disease
or defect in connection with any defense, not just the insanity
defense, the defense must serve notice thirty days after entry
of a not guilty plea to the indictment.17 The Court of Appeals
recently held that this notice requirement applies when the
defense wishes to introduce psychiatric evidence to
demonstrate that a defendant could not fully understand or
waive his Miranda rights.18 The trial court can permit late
notice in the interest of justice for good cause shown before
the close of evidence.19 CPL § 250.10 also contains provisions
regarding the psychiatric examinations the defendant must
submit to at the request of the prosecutor after such notice is
provided.20
Other relevant New York statutes include CPL § 220.15,
which allows a defendant to enter a plea of not responsible
by reason of mental disease or defect to the entire indictment
so long as the court and the prosecutor consent.21 CPL
§ 330.20 governs all post-verdict proceedings when a
defendant is found not responsible by reason of mental
disease or defect, including the confinement of the defendant
in a psychiatric facility and the periodic review of the
defendant’s mental health and appropriate confinement.22
The Practice Insights by John Castellano following CPL
§ 250.10 in GILBERT’S CRIMINAL PRACTICE ANNUAL, 2020
contain useful observations about evaluating whether and
https://www.nycourts.gov/judges/cji/1-General/Defenses/CJI2d.Insanity.pdf.
17. N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 250.10(1), (2) (McKinney 2019).
18. People v. Silburn, 98 N.E.3d 696, 702–03, 707 (N.Y. 2018).
19. CRIM. PROC. § 250.10(2).
20. § 250.10(3)–(5).
21. § 220.15.
22. § 330.20.
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how to pursue a psychiatric defense, including the defense of
insanity. They include discussion concerning the hiring of an
expert to evaluate the viability of the defense, determining
the cooperativeness of the defendant and the likelihood that
the court will allow the defense, and considering the
consequences of a successful defense, including the
possibility of the defendant’s lengthy confinement in a
psychiatric facility after a successful insanity defense.23
Overview
This Article explores the arc of development of the
insanity defense in national history and in New York State.
The Article begins in Part I with a national history. It
discusses the various tests for insanity that have developed
and the widespread impact that the Hinckley acquittal had
on insanity law in the United States. Part II focuses on New
York’s insanity defense. It discusses the history of the
defense in New York, the battle of the experts that typically
ensues, and what happens after a successful insanity
defense. The Article also reviews some famous cases arising
out of Western New York involving the insanity defense.
Finally, Part III contains a brief overview of just a few of the
many important topics that are tangentially relevant to the
insanity defense.

23. John M. Castellano, Practice Insights: Considering Psychiatric Defense, in
GILBERT’S CRIM. PRAC. ANN., 2020, at CPL-389–390.
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I. HISTORY OF THE INSANITY DEFENSE
A. Theoretical Framework
The
insanity
defense
“touches—philosophically,
culturally, and psychologically—on our ultimate social
values and beliefs [and] is rooted in moral principles of
excuse that are accepted in both ordinary human interaction
and criminal law.”24 Justification and excuse are two broad
categories of defenses to criminal behavior. Justification
contemplates the moral culpability of an act itself, whereas
excuse contemplates personal culpability.25 Classic examples
of justification in the law, like self-defense,26 deal with the
circumstances surrounding an act, while excuses, like
involuntary intoxication and duress,27 tend to deal with the
actor’s state of being.
Insanity provides an excuse, rather than a justification,
for criminal behavior. When a defendant is found not guilty
by reason of insanity, the fact-finder has concluded that the
defendant should not be held criminally responsible for his
or her behavior because the defendant cannot understand
the nature or wrongfulness of the criminal conduct, or cannot
conform his or her conduct to the law. In other words, the
defendant has not intentionally chosen to commit a criminal
act. As a society, we conclude that the defendant is not
morally blameworthy because we should punish only those
whose criminal behavior is the result of their own free will.
Traditional goals of criminal punishment, such as
retribution and deterrence, do not apply with equal force to
a defendant who meets the criteria for the insanity defense.

24. PERLIN & CUCOLO, supra note 12, at § 14-1.1 (internal quotation marks
omitted).
25. George P. Fletcher, The Right and The Reasonable, 98 HARV. L. REV. 949,
954 (1985).
26. Id.
27. Id. at 954–55.
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B. Early History
The insanity defense predates both the professional
studies of psychiatry and psychology,28 and can be traced
back to ancient civilizations such as the Talmudic, Greeks,
and Romans.29 Hebrew scriptures from the sixth century
B.C. that discuss criminal offenses group children and the
insane together, excusing both from fault.30 Similarly, under
Rome’s sixth century Code of Justinian, the insane were not
held responsible for their otherwise criminal acts.31
Although the concept of insanity as a defense to criminal
conduct is ancient, our modern understanding of the insanity
defense is the product of centuries of judicial development
within case law. Judges were influenced by the work of legal
scholars such as Henry Bracton. Writing in the thirteenth
century, Bracton—the author of THE LAWS AND CUSTOMS OF
ENGLAND—observed that the insane should be excused from
criminal punishment because, much like children, they are
unable to form the intent necessary to commit a crime.32
C. Development Under Common Law
One of the earliest examples of the insanity defense in
case law comes from England in the case Rex v. Arnold,
decided in 1724.33 There the judge instructed the jury that
for a defendant to be acquitted by reason of insanity he “must
28. EWING, supra note 3, at xxi.
29. PERLIN & CUCOLO, supra note 12, at § 14-1.1.
30. AAPL Practice Guideline for Forensic Psychiatric Evaluation of
Defendants Raising the Insanity Defense, 42 J. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. S3, S4
(2014).
31. PERLIN & CUCOLO, supra note 12, at § 14-1.1.
32. AAPL Practice Guideline, supra note 30, at S4; Daniel P. Greenfield,
Criminal Responsibility from a Clinical Perspective, 37 J. PSYCHIATRY & L. 7, 10–
11 (2009). Henry Bracton is only one of many influential legal scholars whose
early writings on the insanity defense impacted the development of the common
law. See generally Kahler v. Kansas, 140 S Ct. 1021, 1030–32 (2020); see also id.
at 1040–41 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
33. PERLIN & CUCOLO, supra note 12, at § 14-1.2.1.
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be a man that is totally deprived of his understanding and
memory, and doth not know what he is doing, no more than
an infant, . . . a brute, or a wild beast . . . .”34 This archaic
standard for insanity seems representative of the era in
which it was created; however, it would not survive into the
nineteenth century due to the work of the zealous advocate,
Lord Thomas Erskine.
In 1800, Erskine represented James Hadfield, a
defendant charged with the attempted assassination of King
George III while he was attending the theater.35 Erskine
presented evidence that Hadfield suffered a brain injury in
battle, which caused a disturbed mental condition. That
condition manifested in Hadfield’s belief that he could save
the world by taking his own life, but not wanting to kill
himself, Hadfield instead chose to attempt to assassinate the
king, which he knew was punishable by death.36 Erskine won
the case after advancing a standard for insanity sometimes
called the “offspring of a delusion test.” That test did not
require “total insanity.” Instead, it stated that the defendant
should be acquitted if his conduct was the offspring of his
disease.37
The verdict in the Hadfield case was notable for the
subsequent enactment of The Criminal Lunatics Act of 1800.
Before Hadfield’s case, defendants acquitted by reason of
insanity were legally entitled to release unless they could be
confined civilly.38 Four days after Hadfield’s acquittal, a bill
was presented that would mandate the continued
confinement of defendants acquitted by reason of insanity.39

34. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted); AAPL Practice Guideline, supra
note 30, at S4–S5 (emphasis omitted).
35. See Richard Moran, The Origin of Insanity as a Special Verdict: The Trial
for Treason of James Hadfield (1800), 19 L. & SOC’Y REV. 487, 492–93 (1985).
36. Id. at 493, 504–08.
37. Id. at 503; AAPL Practice Guidelines, supra note 30, at S5.
38. Moran, supra note 35, at 487–88.
39. Id. at 511.
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The Act was made retroactive to apply to Hadfield. It further
provided that those acquitted by reason of insanity would be
kept in custody until “His Majesty’s Pleasure Be Known.”40
Unsurprisingly, King George III did not express his
“pleasure” for Hadfield’s release, and Hadfield was confined
until his death in 1841.41
In 1800 it may have seemed like James Hadfield would
go down in history as the attempted assassin who shaped the
insanity defense. Two men, however, would come to share
that title with Hadfield—each unsuccessfully attempting to
assassinate a world leader, each successfully raising an
insanity defense, and each causing a legislative backlash
more severe than the last.
D. The M’Naghten Rule
In 1843, Daniel M’Naghten42 attempted to assassinate
Sir Robert Peel, the British Prime Minister.43 M’Naghten
believed that Peel was conspiring with the Tory Party to
persecute him. He instead killed Edward Drummond, Peel’s
secretary, whom he mistook for Peel.44 At trial, a jury found
M’Naghten not guilty by reason of insanity.45 The public was
outraged by the verdict. They were not alone. In response to
M’Naghten’s acquittal, Queen Victoria summoned the House
of Lords to set a legal standard for the insanity defense.46
The Lords presented five questions regarding the insanity
defense to a panel of judges, and what we now know as the

40. Id. at 513.
41. Id. at 516 n.24.
42. Various spellings for M’Naghten’s name exist, but “M’Naghten” is the
“customary spelling.” Bernard L. Diamond, On the Spelling of Daniel
M’Naghten’s Name, 25 OHIO ST. L.J. 84, 84 (1964).
43. PERLIN & CUCOLO, supra note 12, at § 14-1.2.2; AAPL Practice Guideline,
supra note 30, at S5.
44. AAPL Practice Guideline, supra note 30, at S5.
45. Id.
46. Id.
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M’Naghten rule was derived from two of the judges’
responses:
[T]o establish a defense on the ground of insanity, it must be proved
that, at the time of the committing of the act, the party accused was
laboring under such a defect of reason, from disease of the mind, as
not to know the nature and quality of the act he was doing; or if he
did know it, that he did not know he was doing what was wrong.47

The M’Naghten rule was widely influential in the
development of American jurisprudence on the insanity
defense. Several variations have developed, but in its pure
form, the M’Naghten rule is defined by lack of cognition. For
the defendant to be acquitted by reason of insanity, the
M’Naghten rule requires that as the result of a mental
illness, the defendant either did not know (1) the nature and
quality of the act committed; or (2) that the act was wrong.48
The defendant’s lack of cognition is measured at the time the
crime occurred. In the United States, the M’Naghten rule
was the standard test for insanity in nearly all jurisdictions
until the mid-1900s, and it remains the rule with some
variation in many jurisdictions today, including in New
York.49
E. Alternatives to the M’Naghten Rule
1. The Irresistible Impulse Test
A volitional standard called the irresistible impulse test
can be traced back to 1840 England in the case of Regina v.
Oxford.50 The Oxford case is also notable for being one of the
first in which medical expert witnesses were allowed to state

47. PERLIN & CUCOLO, supra note 12, at § 14-1.2.2; AAPL Practice Guideline,
supra note 30, at S5 (internal quotation marks omitted).
48. PERLIN & CUCOLO, supra note 12, at § 14-1.2.2.
49. Id.; see also Kahler v. Kansas, 140 S. Ct. 1021, 1051 (2020) (Breyer, J.,
dissenting) (Appendix classifying seventeen states and the federal government
as currently using the M’Naghten test for the insanity defense).
50. See PERLIN & CUCOLO, supra note 12, at § 14-1.2.1, n.73; AAPL Practice
Guideline, supra note 30, at S5.
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their opinion on the sanity or insanity of the accused.51
The irresistible impulse test asks whether a defendant
was able to conform his or her conduct to the law, regardless
of whether the defendant is able to understand the nature of
the offense or that it was wrong.52 The first American case to
adopt the test was Parsons v. State, decided by the Supreme
Court of Alabama in 1887.53 At its peak popularity, the
irresistible impulse test was adopted by approximately
eighteen jurisdictions.54 The irresistible impulse test proved
to be better in theory than in practice, however, because of
the difficulty in distinguishing between an irresistible
impulse and an impulse not resisted.55 For example, if a
schizophrenic defendant has delusions that his neighbor is
conspiring against him and hears voices telling him to kill
his neighbor, and then does kill his neighbor, the jury would
be tasked under the irresistible impulse test with
determining whether the defendant could have resisted the
impulse to kill his neighbor. As of 1990, no United States
jurisdiction uses the irresistible impulse test as its sole
standard for the insanity defense.56
2. The Product Test
The product test was developed by New Hampshire
Supreme Court Justice Charles Doe.57 Instead of specifying
51. See Frank R. Freemon, The Origin of the Medical Expert Witness: The
Insanity of Edward Oxford, 22 J. LEGAL MED. 349, 368–73 (2001).
52. PERLIN & CUCOLO, supra note 12, at § 14-1.2.3.
53. AAPL Practice Guideline, supra note 30, at S6 (citing Parsons v. State, 2
So. 854 (Ala. 1887)).
54. PERLIN & CUCOLO, supra note 12, at § 14-1.2.3.
55. See MELTON ET AL., supra note 7, at 191; PERLIN & CUCOLO, supra note 12,
at § 14-1.2.3.
56. AAPL Practice Guideline, supra note 30, at S6. Three states—Georgia,
New Mexico, and Virginia—use the M’Naghten test but include an element of
“volitional incapacity.” See Kahler v. Kansas, 140 S. Ct. at 1052–54 (Breyer, J.,
dissenting).
57. PERLIN & CUCOLO, supra note 12, at § 14-1.2.4 (quoting State v. Pike, 49
N.H. 399, 442 (1870) (Doe, J., dissenting)).
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a cognitive or volitional measure of insanity, the product test
as articulated by Doe in 1870 simply states that “if [an act]
was the offspring or product of mental disease in the
defendant, [the defendant is] not guilty by reason of
insanity.”58 Although it was praised by academics, the
product test was not adopted by any other jurisdiction until
the 1954 case Durham v. United States, decided by District
of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals in an opinion authored
by Judge David Bazelon.59 Durham was heavily criticized,
however, and in 1972 it was overruled by United States v.
Brawner, a decision in which Judge Bazelon concurred, and
replaced by the American Law Institute’s Model Penal Code
test.60 Only New Hampshire and the Virgin Islands currently
use some form of the product test for insanity.61
F. The American Law Institute’s Test
When the D.C. Circuit replaced the product test in
Brawner, it joined the majority of federal courts of appeals in
adopting the American Law Institute’s proposal.62 In 1950,
some form of the M’Naghten test was being used by
approximately two-thirds of states, many of which added
some volitional element, such as an irresistible impulse
component.63 In 1955, the American Law Institute
[hereinafter “ALI”] proposed a new test for the insanity
defense as part of its Model Penal Code.64 The ALI’s proposal
would eventually become as widely influential as the

58. Id.
59. Id. (citing Durham v. United States, 214 F.2d 862 (D.C. Cir. 1954)).
60. See MELTON ET AL., supra note 7, at 191–92; PERLIN & CUCOLO, supra note
12, at § 14-1.2.4 (citing United States v. Brawner, 471 F.2d 969 (D.C. Cir. 1972)).
61. See generally State v. Fichera, 903 A.2d 1030, 1034 (N.H. 2006); AAPL
Practice Guideline, supra note 30, at S5.
62. PERLIN & CUCOLO, supra note 12, at § 14-1.2.5.
63. AAPL Practice Guideline, supra note 30, at S6.
64. Id.
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M’Naghten test.65
The ALI’s Model Penal Code states that “[a] person is not
responsible for criminal conduct if at the time of such conduct
as a result of mental disease or defect he lacks substantial
capacity either to appreciate the criminality [wrongfulness]
of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements
of law.”66 The ALI test is a combination of the M’Naghten test
and the irresistible impulse test.67 Unlike the M’Naghten
test, the ALI test contains a volitional element similar to the
irresistible impulse test: the defendant is not guilty even if
he or she can appreciate the wrongfulness of the conduct, but
cannot conform his or her conduct to the requirements of the
law.68
Interestingly, the ALI’s Model Penal Code standard
prohibited “an abnormality manifested only by repeated
criminal or otherwise antisocial conduct” from being used as
the underlying “mental disease or defect.”69 This was widely
seen as an attempt to prevent “psychopaths” or “sociopaths”
from using the insanity defense to exonerate themselves.70
Some states have excluded antisocial personality disorder, or
even all personality disorders, from the “mental disease or
defect” that forms the basis of the insanity defense.71
The ALI’s Model Penal Code test was generally praised
and considered at the time to be superior to the M’Naghten

65. Id.
66. MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.01(1) (AM. LAW INST. 2020).
67. AAPL Practice Guideline, supra note 30, at S6.
68. See PERLIN & CUCOLO, supra note 12, at § 14-1.2.5; AAPL Practice
Guideline, supra note 30, at S6.
69. MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.01(2).
70. PERLIN & CUCOLO, supra note 12, at § 14-1.2.5.
71. See MELTON ET AL., supra note 7, at 196; Natalie Jacewicz, Does a
Psychopath Who Kills Get To Use the Insanity Defense?, NPR (Aug. 3, 2016),
available at https://www.npr.org/sections/health-shots/2016/08/03/486669552/do
es-a-psychopath-who-kills-get-to-use-the-insanity-defense.
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test due to its incorporation of a volitional element.72 The ALI
test was eventually adopted in some form by over half the
states and all but one federal circuit.73 The widespread
popularity of the ALI test was irrevocably altered, however,
with the 1982 acquittal of John Hinckley Jr., which changed
the landscape of the insanity defense in the United States.74
Despite the differences between the M’Naghten test and
the Model Penal Code test, it is questionable whether the
differences in the tests make any difference as a practical
matter. That is, there is some evidence that the particular
insanity test that jurors are instructed to apply “actually
makes little difference to the verdict they return.”75
Empirical research has certain limitations, but generally
suggests that the type of insanity instruction received by
jurors matters little to the insanity acquittal rate, and some
researchers have concluded that “any differences that exist
between the ALI and [the M’Naghten] standard may be
practically meaningless.”76
G. The Doctrine of Diminished Capacity
Some states that apply the M’Naghten rule have
attempted to broaden their standards through the use of the
doctrine of “diminished capacity.” First developed in
California,77 the doctrine of diminished capacity does not
function as an excuse like the insanity defense. Instead,
diminished capacity is typically raised to challenge the
mental element, or mens rea, required for criminal
conviction, even if the defendant has not raised an insanity

72. See PERLIN & CUCOLO, supra note 12, at § 14-1.2.5.
73. See id.; AAPL Practice Guideline, supra note 30, at S6.
74. See AAPL Practice Guideline, supra note 30, at S6.
75. Stephen P. Garvey, Agency and Insanity, 66 BUFF. L. REV. 123, 126 n.18
(2018).
76. See James R. P. Ogloff, A Comparison of Insanity Defense Standards on
Juror Decision Making, 15 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 509, 511–12, 526 (1991).
77. PERLIN & CUCOLO, supra note 12, at § 14-1.2.6.
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defense.78
It is generally the prosecution’s burden to prove that a
defendant had the necessary mens rea as an element of the
crime. This has caused one court to remark that the doctrine
of diminished capacity is “not a defense at all but merely a
rule of evidence.”79 In New York, for example, the defendant
may present evidence of a mental disease or defect in an
attempt to negate the intent element of the charged crime,
but that does not relieve the prosecution of the burden to
prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant could
and did have the requisite intent.80 In some states, however,
the doctrine of diminished capacity is used to convict the
defendant of a lower grade of offense that does not require
proof of the contested state of mind.81 This variant is
sometimes referred to as the doctrine of “diminished
responsibility,” and is the version that was formerly in place
in California.82
The doctrine of diminished capacity has fallen out of
favor after criticisms regarding its arbitrary application.83
Even California, the birthplace of the doctrine, has
legislatively abolished it.84 In California today, a jury may
not consider evidence of a mental disease or defect with
respect to a defendant’s capacity to form the requisite intent,
but may consider a mental disease or defect with respect to
whether the defendant actually formed the requisite intent.85

78. See id.
79. United States v. Pohlot, 827 F.2d 889, 897 (3d Cir. 1987), cert. denied 484
U.S. 1011 (1988).
80. See, e.g., People v. Segal, 429 N.E.2d 107, 110 (N.Y. 1981).
81. See MELTON ET AL., supra note 7, at 205–06; Peter Arenella, The
Diminished Capacity and Diminished Responsibility Defenses: Two Children of a
Doomed Marriage, 77 COLUM. L. REV. 827, 828–30 (1977).
82. See MELTON ET AL., supra note 7, at 205–06.
83. PERLIN & CUCOLO, supra note 12, at § 14-1.2.6.
84. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 28(b) (West 2003).
85. Id.; see, e.g., People v. Williams, 941 P.2d 752, 777 (Cal. 1997).
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One explanation for the disapproval of the doctrine of
diminished capacity in California is Dan White’s famous use
of the doctrine during his 1979 trial for killing two popular
political figures: San Francisco Supervisor Harvey Milk and
Mayor George Moscone.86 At trial, White’s attorneys
presented the testimony of four psychiatrists and one
psychologist, all of whom agreed that White was suffering
from “serious depression” when he killed Moscone and
Milk.87 Three of those experts opined that as a result of his
depression, White was incapable of premeditating, an
element required for White to be convicted of first-degree
murder.88 White was convicted of two counts of voluntary
manslaughter—a far less serious crime—and the public
outrage was compounded by the relatively light sentence he
received, which allowed him to be paroled after
approximately five years.89
Although it was only briefly mentioned at trial and far
from the foundation of White’s defense, one of White’s expert
witnesses mentioned that White’s indulgence in junk food
like Twinkies was a sign of his depression.90 In other words,
the expert testified that White’s Twinkie consumption was
an effect, rather than a cause, of his depression.91 The media
nevertheless sensationalized the “Twinkie defense,” and it
has been used ever since as a euphemism for a fraudulent
excuse for criminal behavior.92 The California legislature
abolished the diminished capacity defense two years later in
1981, and in 1985, a year after he was paroled, Dan White

86. CHARLES PATRICK EWING & JOSEPH T. MCCANN, MINDS
CASES IN LAW AND PSYCHOLOGY, 70–74 (2006).
87. Id. at 75.
88. Id. at 74–75.
89. See id. at 78.
90. Id. at 75–76.
91. Id. at 76.
92. Id. at 69–70, 77–79.
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committed suicide.93 The expert witness who discussed
White’s consumption of junk food during the trial said years
later, “If I found a cure for cancer, they’d still say I was the
guy who invented ‘the Twinkie defense.’”94
H. The Impact of the Hinckley Case
1. United States v. Hinckley
John Hinckley, Jr. first became withdrawn and isolated
from his peers in high school and continued to mentally
deteriorate into adulthood.95 After a few unsuccessful
attempts at college, Hinckley moved to Hollywood where he
developed an obsession with the movie Taxi Driver and with
actress Jodie Foster.96 In the film, the male lead plots to
assassinate a presidential candidate to win the affection of a
love interest.97 Hinckley’s obsession led to the stalking of
Foster, and he began planning a presidential assassination
of his own.98 Hinckley first targeted Jimmy Carter, but
turned his attention toward Ronald Reagan following the
1980 election.99 In 1981, Hinckley traveled to D.C. and
attacked Reagan, firing several shots that hit a police officer,
a secret service agent, Reagan and his press secretary.100 All
of the victims initially survived the attack.101 Press Secretary
James Brady died from his injuries in 2014.102

93. Id. at 79.
94. Id. at 80.
95. See id. at 92.
96. Id. at 92–93.
97. Id. at 92.
98. Id. at 93.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 95.
101. See id.
102. See Peter Hermann & Michael Ruane, Medical Examiner Rules James
Brady’s Death a Homicide, Wash. Post (Aug. 8, 2014), https://www.washington
post.com/local/crime/james-bradys-death-ruled-homicide-by-dc-medical-examine
r/2014/08/08/686de224-1f41-11e4-82f9-2cd6fa8da5c4_story.html?noredirect=on;
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Hinckley pleaded not guilty by reason of insanity to
multiple counts of attempted murder.103 The trial took place
in D.C., where the ALI’s Model Penal Code test was the
standard for insanity.104 At trial, all the expert witnesses,
including those who testified for the prosecution, agreed that
Hinckley was mentally ill, although they disagreed on the
correct diagnosis.105 The defense experts testified that
Hinckley lacked substantial capacity to appreciate the
wrongfulness of his conduct or conform his conduct to the
law, while the prosecution’s experts disagreed.106 After three
days of deliberation, the jury returned a verdict of not guilty
by reason of insanity.107
2. National Response
The verdict in the Hinckley case was met with bipartisan
criticism and public outrage.108 Just two years later,
Congress passed the Insanity Defense Reform Act of 1984
with virtually no opposition.109 The Act made four major
changes to the federal insanity defense: (1) it removed the
volitional element of the test, (2) it shifted the burden to the
defense to prove insanity with clear and convincing evidence,
(3) it barred expert testimony on the ultimate issue as to
whether or not the defendant was insane at the time of the
crime, and (4) it provided that a defendant found not guilty
of a crime by reason of insanity was to be confined for the
same length of time as the maximum prison sentence for that

Trevor Hughes, John Hinckley Jr. released from mental hospital after more than
30 years, USA Today (Sept. 10, 2016, 3:30 PM), https://www.usatoday.com/
story/news/2016/09/10/would—reagan-assassin-john-hinckley-jr-released-menta
l-hospital/90191312/.
103. See EWING & MCCANN, supra note 86, at 95.
104. Id. at 96.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 97–98.
107. Id. at 98.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 99.
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crime, subject to judicial revision if the defendant recovers
from the illness.110
After the Hinckley verdict, two prominent professional
organizations also changed their positions on the insanity
defense. The American Psychiatric Association took the
position that the insanity defense should be limited to the
most severe cases of mental illness and that the insanity
defense should not include a volitional element.111 The
American Medical Association took the position that the
insanity defense should be abolished and that mental illness
should be used only to argue that the defendant lacked the
required mens rea.112 Both the APA and the AMA would later
rescind these positions in 2007 and 2005, respectively.113
3. State Reforms
In the wake of the Hinckley trial, thirty-six states in total
altered their insanity defense in some form.114 Five states—
Idaho, Kansas, Montana, Utah, and Nevada—abolished the
insanity defense as an affirmative defense, although
Nevada’s Supreme Court reinstated the insanity defense in
2001.115 Several other states shifted the burden to prove
insanity to the defendant, others modified their test for
insanity, and others adopted the verdict of “guilty but
mentally ill.”116
110. See 18 U.S.C. § 17 (1986); EWING & MCCANN, supra note 86, at 99; see also
AAPL Practice Guideline, supra note 30, at S7–S8.
111. AAPL Practice Guideline, supra note 30, at S6.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id. at S7.
115. Id.; see generally Finger v. State, 27 P.3d 66 (Nev. 2001). Idaho, Kansas,
Montana, and Utah allow a defendant to introduce evidence of mental illness to
show that the defendant was incapable of forming the intent required to commit
the crime, thereby negating an element of the crime—the mens rea—that the
prosecution must prove for the defendant to be convicted. See Kahler v. Kansas,
140 S. Ct. at 1026 n.3.
116. EWING & MCCANN, supra note 86, at 99; AAPL Practice Guideline, supra
note 30, at S8.
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4. Guilty but Mentally Ill
A “guilty but mentally ill” verdict allows a jury to find a
defendant guilty of a crime where the defendant was not
legally insane at the time of the crime but suffered from some
form of mental illness not rising to the level of insanity.117
Approximately a dozen states adopted “guilty but mentally
ill” as a possible verdict in the wake of the Hinckley trial.118
The “guilty but mentally ill” verdict has been criticized
as a compromise verdict that jurors choose when they do not
wish to find the defendant not guilty by reason of insanity.119
Some studies conducted with mock juries have shown that
jurors tend to favor guilty but mentally ill verdicts when they
are available.120
Critics note that although those found guilty but
mentally ill are supposed to receive mental health treatment
in prison, this occurs at the discretion of the correctional
facility.121 Supporters of the guilty but mentally ill verdict,
by contrast, have characterized it as a means of filling a gap
with a verdict for defendants who deserve to be imprisoned
but also are in need of treatment.122
5. Hinckley’s Release
In 2016, at the age of sixty-one,123 John Hinckley was
released from confinement thirty-five years after he
attempted to assassinate President Reagan.124 At the time

117. PERLIN & CUCOLO, supra note 12, at § 14-1.2.7.
118. See Clark v. Arizona, 548 U.S. 735, 751–52 nn.19 & 21 (2006); Natalie
Jacewicz, ‘Guilty But Mentally Ill’ Doesn’t Protect Against Harsh Sentences, NPR
(Aug. 2, 2016, 1:22 PM), https://www.npr.org/sections/health-shots/2016/08/02/
486632201/guilty-but-mentally-ill-doesnt-protect-against-harsh-sentences.
119. Jacewicz, supra note 118.
120. Id.
121. PERLIN & CUCOLO, supra note 12, at § 14-1.2.7.
122. Jacewicz, supra note 118.
123. Hughes, supra note 102.
124. Jacewicz, supra note 118.
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Hinckley was released, officials at the hospital he had been
housed in said that his mental illness had been in remission
for decades.125 Hinckley is required to continue receiving
outpatient treatment.126

125. Jacewicz, supra note 12.
126. Hughes, supra note 102.
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II. NEW YORK STATE’S INSANITY DEFENSE
A. History of New York’s Insanity Defense
1. Early Case Law
As early as 1829, New York law declared that “[n]o act
done by a person in a state of insanity can be punished as an
offense,” but that law did not define insanity.127 In 1845, a
New York court charged a jury under the M’Naghten rule for
the insanity defense.128
The case widely attributed as establishing the
M’Naghten rule as the test for the insanity defense in New
York is Freeman v. People.129 In that case, the defendant,
“the illiterate grandson of a former slave,” had murdered a
prominent family in Auburn, New York.130 The defendant
entered a plea of insanity, and he was convicted of murder
and sentenced to death.131 In 1847, the Supreme Court of
Judicature, in an exercise of its appellate jurisdiction,
ordered a new trial and held that the M’Naghten standard
was the proper one to apply for the insanity defense.132 In
Flanagan v. People, decided in 1873, the New York Court of
Appeals, created in 1847 as the highest court in New York
state, reaffirmed that M’Naghten was the proper test and
rejected a request to adopt the irresistible impulse test.133

127. N.Y. REV. STAT. pt. 4, ch. 1, tit. VII, § 2 (1829); see also ROBERT ALLAN
CARTER, HISTORY OF THE INSANITY DEFENSE IN NEW YORK STATE 2 (1982).
128. Cynthia G. Hawkins-Leon, Literature as Law: The History of the Insanity
Plea and a Fictional Application within the Law & Literature Canon, 72 TEMP. L.
REV. 381, 413–14 (1999) (citing People v. Kleim, 1 Edm. Sel. Cas. 13, 25–26
(1845)).
129. Freeman v. People, 4 Denio 9 (1847); see also Hawkins-Leon, supra note
128, at 415; CARTER, supra note 127, at 2–3.
130. Hawkins-Leon, supra note 128, at 415.
131. See Freeman, 4 Denio at 18; Hawkins-Leon, supra note 128, at 415.
132. See Freeman, 4 Denio at 28–29.
133. Flanagan v. People, 52 N.Y. 467, 469–70 (1873).
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2. Codification and Modernization of M’Naghten
The M’Naghten rule was codified by the legislature in
1881.134 In the 1915 case of People v. Schmidt, Judge
Benjamin Cardozo, writing for the Court of Appeals, declined
to grant a new trial to a defendant who claimed that he
merely feigned insanity at his first trial in an attempt to
obtain an acquittal, and Judge Cardozo opined that New
York’s statutory iteration of the M’Naghten rule would likely
apply where the defendant knows that the act is legally
wrong but does not appreciate that it is morally wrong.135
The statute remained largely unchanged until 1965.
Governor Harriman became aware of the shortcomings of the
M’Naghten rule as a result of a clemency hearing following
the Court of Appeals’s affirmance in the case of People v.
Horton, decided in 1954.136 Governor Harriman created a
commission to examine possible changes to the insanity
defense, whose work culminated in the 1958 “Foster
Report.”137 The Foster Report noted three major objections to
the M’Naghten rule:
First, it was reported that a difficulty arose in the use of the word
“know” in M’Naghten because a defendant might be able to
verbalize that some act is wrong and yet have no depth of
understanding as to what this means. Another defect with
M’Naghten was said to be its emphasis on the actor’s cognitive
capacity. The commission noted that the M’Naghten test
disregarded the notion that an individual might have minimal
awareness of some fact and at the same time lack the ability to
control his conduct in light of this. Finally, the commission stated

134. Hawkins-Leon, supra note 128, at 417 (citing 1881 N.Y. Laws 676, §§ 20–
23).
135. See People v Schmidt, 216 N.Y. 324, 339–40 (1915). For a thorough
account of the bizarre Schmidt case and Judge Cardozo’s role in it, see RICHARD
POLENBERG, THE WORLD OF BENJAMIN CARDOZO: PERSONAL VALUES AND THE
JUDICIAL PROCESS, 71–81 (1997).
136. People v. Adams, 257 N.E.2d 610, 611 (N.Y. 1970) (citing People v. Horton,
123 N.E.2d 609 (N.Y. 1954)); see also CARTER, supra note 127, at 9–10; Clemency
Plea for Horton Based on Insanity Claim, ELMIRA STAR-GAZETTE, Jan. 12, 1955,
at 8.
137. Adams, 257 N.E.2d at 611.
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that M’Naghten taken on its face called for a total impairment of
ability to know, whereas in even the most extreme psychoses it is
impossible to say that the actor was totally bereft of knowledge or
control.138

The Foster Report recommended adoption of the ALI’s
Model Penal Code standard with some adaptation, and in
1963, the Temporary Commission on Revision of the Penal
Law and Criminal Code issued an interim report adopting
the recommendations of the Foster Report.139 That
recommendation,
however,
was
strongly
opposed,
140
particularly by district attorneys.
In 1965, former Penal
Law § 1120 was amended to substantially the same version
of the insanity defense that exists today.141 The revised
statute provided that a defendant was not guilty by reason
of insanity if, at the time of the criminal conduct, by reason
of mental disease or defect, the defendant “lack[ed]
substantial capacity to know or appreciate either: (a) [t]he
nature and consequence of such conduct; or (b) [t]hat such
conduct was wrong.”142
The revised standard was substantially similar to the
M’Naghten rule, but with some important differences. Lack
of “substantial capacity” was considered a more realistic
standard than the total incapacity required by the
M’Naghten rule.143 In addition, the word “appreciate” was
intended to apply to a defendant with some minimal, surface
awareness that an act is wrong but who nevertheless is
unable to understand the “legal and moral import of the
conduct involved.”144 With respect to the meaning of
138. Id.
139. Id.; see also CARTER, supra note 127, at 11–12; INTERIM REP. OF
COMMISSION ON REVISION OF PENAL LAW AND CRIM. CODE, Leg. Doc. No. 8 at 24–
25 (1963).
140. Adams, 257 N.E.2d at 612.
141. Id.
142. Id. (citing N.Y. PENAL LAW § 1120 (amended 1965)).
143. Id.
144. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
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“appreciate,” the Court of Appeals has stated that a jury may
be instructed that mere surface knowledge, such as “the type
of knowledge children have of propositions which they can
state, but cannot understand,” is not sufficient to satisfy the
“appreciate” requirement.145
3. 1980s Changes
Other significant changes to New York’s insanity defense
occurred in the 1980s. In 1980, the legislature passed the
Insanity Defense Reform Act, which implemented many
recommendations made by the Law Revision Commission.146
The bill contained New York’s first comprehensive
procedural laws for the use of the insanity defense,147 and
was, in part, a response to the case of Robert Torsney.148
In 1976, after responding to a call at a housing project
but finding the issue already resolved, Torsney, a white
NYPD officer, calmly and inexplicably shot an unarmed
black teenager in the head after the youth asked about the
police presence.149 Torsney initially claimed self-defense, but
at trial, he argued insanity based on the testimony of a
forensic psychiatrist who opined that despite no documented
history of mental illness, Torsney suffered a psychosis
associated with an imperceptible epileptic seizure at the very
moment of the shooting.150 An all-white jury found Torsney
not guilty by reason of insanity.151 Torsney was committed to

145. Id. at 613; see also Insanity, supra note 16.
146. 1980 N.Y. Laws 1616, ch. 548; 1980 N.Y. Sess. Laws 1879–80 (McKinney)
(Memorandum from Gov. Hugh Carey approving the Insanity Defense Reform
Act).
147. Compare 1980 N.Y. Laws ch. 548, § 11 (enacting modern version of N.Y.
CRIM. PROC. LAW § 330.20) with N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 330.20 (McKinney 1971).
148. Hawkins-Leon, supra note 128, at 425–26; see also Dorothy Spektorov
McClellan, The New York State Insanity Defense Reform Act of 1980: A Legislative
Experiment, 17 BULL. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY L. 129, 143–44 (1989).
149. EWING, supra note 3, at 22.
150. Id. at 24–28.
151. Id. at 29.
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a psychiatric facility but spent only a year and a half there,
after doctors were unable to detect any continuing mental
illness besides a personality disorder and impulse control
issues.152 The legislature subsequently passed the Insanity
Defense Reform Act in 1980 in part as a response to the
Torsney case.153
Before the 1980 Insanity Defense Reform Act, review for
discharge or release of defendants found not guilty by reason
of insanity and confined in a psychiatric institution was
initiated by application, filed either by the patient or by the
commissioner of mental hygiene.154 Transfers and furlough
were left to administrative discretion, and no particular
Office of Mental Health regulations controlled the postverdict procedure.155 After the 1980 Act, and under the
current version of CPL § 330.20, patients found not guilty by
reason of insanity are regularly reviewed for discharge or
release, and all furloughs, transfers, releases, and discharges
must be accomplished by court order after thorough
evaluation.156
Although the same Law Revision Commission Report
that led to the 1980 Insanity Defense Reform Act rejected
proposals to reclassify insanity as an affirmative defense,157
in 1984, in part as a response to the Hinckley verdict, the
New York legislature made insanity an affirmative

152. See In re Torsney, 394 N.E.2d 262, 263–70 (N.Y. 1979); EWING, supra note
3, at 30–32.
153. See, e.g., 1981 N.Y. Sess. Laws 2262 (McKinney) (1980 Report of Law
Revision Commission on The Defense of Insanity in New York State, citing the
Torsney case for the proposition that N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 330.20 “needs a
complete overhaul.”).
154. See N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 330.20 (McKinney 1971).
155. See id.; see also McClellan, supra note 148, at 132–33.
156. See N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 330.20 (McKinney 2019); McClellan, supra
note 148, at 133–34.
157. See 1981 N.Y. Sess. Laws 2256–59 (1980 Report of Law Revision
Commission on The Defense of Insanity in New York State).
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defense.158 Before 1984, the prosecution had the burden to
prove that the defendant was sane beyond a reasonable
doubt, although the prosecution could nevertheless rely to
some extent on a presumption of sanity.159 Since the 1984
amendment, the defendant now has the burden to prove his
or her insanity by a preponderance of the evidence.160 The
Court of Appeals upheld the constitutionality of that
change.161
B. The Battle of the Experts
1. The
Testimony

Significance

and

Limitations

of

Expert

Testimony from experts in psychology or psychiatry “is a
staple in virtually all insanity trials.”162 In New York courts,
an expert witness must be permitted to state his or her
opinion with respect to “the extent, if any, to which the
capacity of the defendant to know or appreciate the nature
and consequence of such conduct, or its wrongfulness, was
impaired as a result of mental disease or defect at that
time.”163 Such testimony on the “ultimate issue” is prohibited
in the federal courts.164
Some of the limitations on expert testimony are
illustrated by the case of Andrew Goldstein. In 1999,
Goldstein pushed Kendra Webdale off of a New York City
subway platform in front of an oncoming train, which hit and
158. 1984 N.Y. Sess. Laws 1973–75 (McKinney) (L 1984, ch. 668); see also 1984
N.Y. Sess. Laws 3399 (McKinney) (Memorandum of Legis. Rep. of N.Y.C. on
L 1984, ch. 668, mentioning the Hinckley case as an example of recent events that
have “dramatically exposed the dangers of the insanity defense as currently
formulated”); see also Bill Jacket, L 1984, ch. 668 (containing several mentions of
the Hinckley verdict).
159. See People v. Silver, 310 N.E.2d 520, 522 (N.Y. 1974).
160. See N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 25.00(2), 40.15 (McKinney 2019).
161. People v. Kohl, 527 N.E.2d 1182, 1182 (N.Y. 1988).
162. EWING, supra note 3, at 22.
163. N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 60.55(1) (McKinney 2019).
164. FED. R. EVID. 704(b).
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killed her on impact.165 Webdale was a University at Buffalo
graduate who grew up in Upstate New York.166 Goldstein
had been in and out of psychiatric hospitals over a dozen
times with various diagnoses, including paranoid
schizophrenia and bipolar disorder with psychotic
features.167
Goldstein’s first trial ended in a hung jury.168 During the
second trial, the prosecution’s strategy was to concede that
Goldstein had a “relatively mild” mental illness, but to argue
that his killing of Webdale was a result of his hatred of
women, not his mental illness.169 To that end, an expert
witness for the prosecution testified as to what she was told
by various people from Goldstein’s past about Goldstein’s
prior assaults and sexually inappropriate conduct with
women.170 After his second trial, Goldstein was convicted and
sentenced to twenty-five years to life in prison.171 On appeal,
the Court of Appeals held that the expert’s testimony
regarding what others had told her was testimonial
hearsay—that is, a statement made out of court by another
person, offered for the truth of the matter asserted, and
intended for use at trial—and therefore inadmissible.172 The
Court further held that admission of the testimonial hearsay
statements through the prosecution’s expert could not be
considered harmless inasmuch as the People’s case “drew
some significant support from the improperly admitted
statements.”173 After he was granted a third trial by the

165. EWING, supra note 3, at 116.
166. Id. at 114.
167. Id. at 114–15.
168. Id. at 120.
169. Id. at 117, 121.
170. See People v. Goldstein, 843 N.E.2d 727, 729–30 (N.Y. 2005); EWING,
supra note 3, at 123–24.
171. EWING, supra note 3, at 124.
172. Goldstein, 843 N.E.2d at 732–33; EWING, supra note 3, at 125–26.
173. Goldstein, 843 N.E.2d at 734.
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Goldstein was recently released from prison, and it is
possible that he may be subject to “Kendra’s Law,” a law
passed in the wake of Kendra Webdale’s death that allows
for court-ordered assisted outpatient therapy for mentally ill
individuals with a history of hospitalizations or violence.175
2. The Ethics of Expert Testimony
In its Practice Guideline for Forensic Psychiatric
Evaluation of Defendants Raising the Insanity Defense, the
American Academy of Psychiatry and the Law [hereinafter
“AAPL”] discusses ethical issues faced by expert witnesses
testifying in a criminal trial where the defendant has raised
an insanity defense. For example, while psychiatrists
generally owe a duty to their patient, the AAPL states that a
forensic psychiatrist retained by the defense owes a duty to
the defense attorney.176 Additionally, while a psychiatrist
usually operates under a duty of confidentiality, forensic
psychiatrists retained by the prosecution must warn the
defendant that evaluations are not confidential and may be
used against him or her.177 Furthermore, the AAPL states
that a forensic psychiatrist has a duty to “further the
interests of justice, regardless of the identity of the retaining
party.”178

174. EWING, supra note 3, at 127.
175. See In re K.L., 806 N.E.2d 480, 482 (N.Y. 2004); NEW YORK STATE OFFICE
MENTAL HEALTH, KENDRA’S LAW: FINAL REPORT ON THE STATUS OF ASSISTED
OUTPATIENT TREATMENT 1 (2005), https://www.omh.ny.gov/omhweb/kendra_web/
finalreport/intro.htm; Ali Watkins, A Horrific Crime on the Subway Led to
Kendra’s Law. Years Later, Has it Helped?, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 11, 2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/09/11/nyregion/kendras-law-andrew-goldsteinsubway-murder.html.
OF

176. AAPL Practice Guideline, supra note 30, at S18.
177. See id. at S19.
178. Id.
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Although not true in all jurisdictions,179 in New York, the
prosecution is permitted to call a psychiatrist who has
treated the defendant even if that expert is not called to
testify by the defense, because by asserting an insanity
defense, the defendant makes a “complete and effective
waiver . . . of any claim of privilege.”180 Defense counsel may
consult with a psychiatrist “in order to obtain advice
concerning the efficacy of an insanity plea . . . without fear of
later courtroom disclosure,” but only facts and observations
“disclosed by the attorney” are subject to a work product
privilege.181 The AAPL states that forensic psychiatrists
should have sufficient knowledge of how the laws in their
jurisdiction may affect their role in an insanity trial.182
Professor Ewing stated in one of his books that some
mental health experts have famously offered testimony
regarding the insanity defense at trial that is “clinically,
legally, or factually suspect.”183 He provides the example of
the expert testimony about the impeccably timed epileptic
seizure suffered by Robert Torsney, discussed earlier.184 He
also cites the expert testimony offered by the prosecution in
the Goldstein case, which led to a new trial, and the
testimony offered by the defense in the case of Arthur
Shawcross, which this Article will address shortly.185
3. Ethical Considerations for Attorneys
Attorneys face their own set of ethical obligations when
it comes to psychiatric evaluations performed in connection
with the insanity defense. When a psychiatrist retained by

179. See id. at S18.
180. People v. Edney, 350 N.E.2d 400, 402–03 (N.Y. 1976); see N.Y. CRIM. PROC.
LAW § 60.55(2) (McKinney 2019).
181. Edney, 350 N.E.2d at 403.
182. See AAPL Practice Guideline, supra note 30, at S18–S19.
183. See EWING, supra note 3, at 162.
184. See id.
185. Id.
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the prosecution in an insanity case finds that a defendant
meets the legal criteria for insanity, the prosecution has a
legal duty to inform the defense.186 By contrast, when a
psychiatrist retained by the defense finds that a defendant is
legally sane, defense counsel has no obligation to reveal that
information to the prosecution. In fact, defense counsel has
an ethical duty not to do so, and may seek other, more
favorable expert opinions.187 When both prosecution and
defense experts agree that a defendant is insane, the case
typically does not proceed to trial unless there is some other
issue presented,188 and the court may accept a plea of not
responsible by reason of mental disease or defect. 189 In most
jurisdictions, if the defendant is deemed competent to stand
trial, defense counsel cannot impose an insanity defense over
the defendant’s objection.190 The New York Court of Appeals
has not yet spoken on this precise issue.
C. After a Successful Insanity Defense
1. Jury Instruction
New York law provides that when a defendant has raised
the affirmative defense of not responsible by reason of
mental disease or defect, the court must instruct the jury as
follows, “without elaboration”:
A jury during its deliberations must never consider or speculate
concerning matters relating to the consequences of its verdict.
However, because of the lack of common knowledge regarding the
consequences of a verdict of not responsible by reason of mental
disease or defect, I charge you that if this verdict is rendered by you
there will be hearings as to the defendant’s present mental
condition and, where appropriate, involuntary commitment

186. Id. at 70.
187. Id.
188. See id.
189. See N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 220.15 (McKinney 2019).
190. See generally PERLIN & CUCOLO, supra note 12, at § 14-1.7; AAPL Practice
Guideline, supra note 30, at S19.
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proceedings.191

That provision was added as part of New York’s Insanity
Defense Reform Act of 1980 in order to avoid speculation by
the jury that a mentally ill defendant who is a danger to the
community might be released back into the public, which
may lead the jury to improperly convict a defendant who
meets the requirements of the insanity defense.192 Other
jurisdictions impose different rules regarding whether the
jury can or must be informed of the consequences of an
insanity acquittal.193
2. Duration of Confinement
In most states, when a defendant raises a successful
insanity defense, the defendant is confined to a psychiatric
institution with no definite release date, and is released only
when it is safe to do so.194 Likewise, New York indefinitely
confines forensic patients found not guilty by reason of
insanity if, after an initial examination, the defendant is
determined to have a dangerous mental disorder.195 New
York does, however, regularly review such cases,
approximately every two years, to determine whether the
defendant should be released or placed into a less secure
facility.196
In New York, the statute that governs the confinement
of defendants found not guilty by reason of insanity is CPL
§ 330.20, enacted as part of the Insanity Defense Reform Act

191. CRIM. PROC. § 300.10(3).
192. See 1980 N.Y. Laws 1619, ch. 548, § 8; 1981 N.Y. Sess. Laws 2272–73
(McKinney) (1980 Report of Law Revision Commission on The Defense of
Insanity in New York State).
193. See generally People v. Adams, 257 N.E.2d 610, 614 (N.Y. 1970)
(discussing jury instruction before 1980 statutory enactment); PERLIN & CUCOLO,
supra note 12, at § 14-1.3.4.
194. See MELTON ET AL., supra note 7, at 189; McClelland, supra note 6.
195. See CRIM. PROC. § 330.20; McClelland, supra note 6.
196. CRIM. PROC. § 330.20(h)–(i); McClelland, supra note 6.

838

BUFFALO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 68

of 1980, discussed earlier.197 “The postadjudication statutory
scheme set forth in CPL § 330.20 provides three alternative
tracks, with different treatment progressions and procedural
consequences, based upon the hearing court’s postacquittal
determination of a defendant’s mental condition.”198
Defendants who are determined to have a “dangerous mental
disorder” are classified as “track one” insanity acquittees and
are confined in a secure facility for treatment.199 If the
defendant is determined to be “mentally ill” but not
dangerous, the defendant is classified as a “track two”
insanity acquittee and may be subject to involuntary civil
commitment in a nonsecure facility pursuant to the Mental
Hygiene Law.200 Finally, if the court determines that the
defendant does not have a dangerous mental disorder and is
not mentally ill, the defendant must be released, “either
unconditionally or subject to an order of conditions.”201
A minority of states, including California, limit the time
that a defendant may be involuntarily confined in a
psychiatric institution to the maximum time the defendant
would have served in prison if convicted, but the California
law also allows for perpetual two-year extensions.202 In Jones
v. United States, the United States Supreme Court held that
it does not violate due process for a defendant acquitted by
reason of insanity to be involuntarily confined to a
psychiatric institution “until such time as he has regained
his sanity or is no longer a danger to himself or society,” even
if the defendant is confined for much longer than the
maximum sentence the defendant could have received if
197. See In re James Q., 120 N.E.3d 358, 360 (N.Y. 2019).
198. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted); see generally In re Jamie R. v.
Consilvio, 844 N.E.2d 285, 287–88 (N.Y. 2006).
199. See CRIM. PROC. § 330.20(1)(c), (1)(f), (6); In re James Q., 120 N.E.3d at
360.
200. See CRIM. PROC. § 330.20(1)(d), (7); In re James Q., 120 N.E.3d at 360–61;
People v. Stone, 536 N.E.2d 1137, 1139 (N.Y. 1989).
201. CRIM. PROC. § 330.20(7); see also James Q., 120 N.E.3d at 361.
202. See McClelland, supra note 6.
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convicted of the crime.203
3. New York’s Forensic Psychiatric Facilities
The New York State Office of Mental Health has
oversight of several facilities that serve “justice-involved”
individuals.204 Of these facilities, three treat defendants
found not responsible for criminal conduct by reason of
mental disease or defect: Kirby Forensic Psychiatric Center
on Wards Island, Mid-Hudson Forensic Psychiatric Center in
New Hampton, and the Rochester Regional Forensic Unit,
located at the Rochester Psychiatric Center on Elmwood
Avenue.205
The Rochester Regional Forensic Unit’s stated goal for
patients found not responsible by reason of mental disease or
defect is “to evaluate and treat their dangerous mental
disorder . . . [and] to prepare these patients for transfer to a
civil unit or nonsecure unit as soon as it is determined that
they are no longer a danger to themselves or others because
of their mental illness.”206
D. Selection of Famous Local Cases Involving the Insanity
Defense
1. George Fitzsimmons
Professor Ewing writes in his book on the insanity
defense that when he first moved to Buffalo, New York in
1983 and asked why the insanity defense was, at that time,
“rarely, if ever” used in the area, local attorneys repeatedly

203. Jones v. United States, 463 U.S. 354, 370 (1983).
204. NEW YORK STATE OFFICE OF MENTAL HEALTH, DIVISION OF FORENSIC
SERVICES, https://www.omh.ny.gov/omhweb/forensic/bfs.htm (last visited Apr. 18,
2020).
205. Id.
206. Rochester Psychiatric Center, Rochester Regional Forensic Unit, NEW
YORK STATE OFFICE OF MENTAL HEALTH, https://www.omh.ny.gov/omhweb/
facilities/ropc/consumers/forensic.html (last visited Apr. 18, 2020).
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mentioned the name “Fitzsimmons.”207 In 1969, George
Fitzsimmons “karate-chopped” his parents to death in the
Buffalo suburb of Amherst.208 At the subsequent bench trial,
a judge found Fitzsimmons not responsible by reason of
mental disease or defect.209 Just three years after
Fitzsimmons was acquitted and confined in a psychiatric
hospital, a judge ordered Fitzsimmons released, after four
psychiatrists at that hospital testified that Fitzsimmons was
no longer a danger to himself or others.210 He was to remain
under the supervision of the Office of Mental Hygiene for five
years, and his release was subject to him remaining not
dangerous to others.211
Not long after being released, Fitzsimmons and his new
wife moved to Pennsylvania to live with Fitsimmons’s aunt
and uncle.212 While in Pennsylvania, Fitzsimmons seriously
assaulted his wife, the second time he had attacked her. New
York authorities believed that they were powerless to take
any action.213 While awaiting sentencing on the
Pennsylvania assault, Fitzsimmons stabbed his aunt and
uncle to death during an argument over a television
program.214 During the following trial, where he was
represented by renowned criminal defense attorney F. Lee
Bailey, Fitzsimmons again raised an insanity defense.215
This time, a jury rejected the defense and found Fitzsimmons
guilty of murder.216 He was sentenced to life in prison.217
207. EWING, supra note 3, at xi.
208. Id.
209. Id. at xi–xii.
210. Id. at xii.
211. Id.
212. Id. at xii.
213. See id. at xii–xiii.
214. Id. at xiii.
215. Id. at xiii–xiv.
216. Id. at xiv.
217. Id.
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Western New York’s perception of the insanity defense
was shaped by the Fitzsimmons case, and many believe that
the Fitzsimmons case is typical of an insanity case.218 Asked
in 2000 whether the insanity defense was “dead” in Buffalo,
the late criminal defense attorney John Nuchereno
responded, “It’s not dead, but its heart beats very weakly.”219
2. Arthur Shawcross
In 1972, Arthur Shawcross admitted to killing two
children in the Watertown, New York area.220 Due to
concerns over the admissibility of his statements and the
weak evidence against him, the prosecution offered
Shawcross a plea deal in which he would plead guilty to
manslaughter for killing one of the children.221 In 1987, after
14 years in prison, Shawcross was released to parole
supervision.222 His parole officer warned his superiors that
he considered Shawcross to be “possibly the most dangerous
individual to have been released to this community in many
years.”223
Shawcross was settled in Rochester in 1987 by parole
officials.224 Over the next two years, Shawcross raped and
killed 11 women.225 He was finally apprehended in 1990 after
he returned to the scene of one of his crimes.226 Shawcross
gave a detailed confession to each murder.227

218. Id. at xiv–xv.
219. Id. at xv (quoting Gene Warner, Insanity Plea on Life Support, BUFFALO
NEWS (Feb. 29, 2000), https://buffalonews.com/2000/02/28/insanity-plea-on-lifesupport/).
220. Id. at 64–66.
221. Id. at 65–66.
222. Id. at 66.
223. Id. at 67.
224. Id.
225. Id.
226. Id. at 68.
227. Id.
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The defense vigorously pursued an insanity defense.
Counsel retained two expert psychiatrists to evaluate
Shawcross, and when both refused to testify that Shawcross
was insane, the defense found one who would.228 Using
techniques such as hypnotism, the defense expert heard
Shawcross’s increasing unbelievable tales of childhood
violence and atrocities witnessed and perpetrated during the
Vietnam War, and she diagnosed him with post-traumatic
stress disorder so severe that it caused him to enter a
“dissociative state” during his murders.229 On crossexamination, the expert admitted that she did not use
standard procedures for the hypnosis, did not verify that the
traumatic events Shawcross relayed to her ever occurred,
and did not discuss each of the killings with Shawcross
because they were “not distinct.”230 The prosecution expert,
by contrast, pointed out that many of the events Shawcross
relayed to the defense expert were “impossible,” and
diagnosed Shawcross with antisocial personality disorder,
“the modern-day version of what was formerly called a
psychopath or sociopath.”231 The jury rejected the insanity
defense, and Shawcross was sentenced to a minimum term
of 250 years’ imprisonment.232
3. Gail Trait
The case of Gail Trait is another famous insanity case
out of Buffalo. In 1978, Trait killed her four children in a
“voodoo-style” ritual.233 After a jury rejected her insanity
defense, Trait was sentenced to twenty-five years to life in

228. Id. at 69–70.
229. Id. at 71–72.
230. Id. at 74–75.
231. Id. at 76–78.
232. Id. at 79.
233. Matt Gryta, Trait, Convicted of Killing Her 4 Children, Fights New Trial,
BUFFALO NEWS (Oct. 24, 1988), https://buffalonews.com/1988/10/24/traitconvicted-of-killing-her-4-children-fights-new-trial/.
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prison, where she received treatment for schizophrenia.234
Ten years later, however, the Appellate Division overturned
Trait’s conviction for ineffective assistance of counsel.235 The
court held that Trait’s counsel had been unprepared and that
his performance had “alienated the jurors to such an extent
that it may have had an adverse effect on their verdict.”236
After her second trial, Trait was found not responsible by
reason of mental disease or defect and was confined to a
psychiatric facility.237
4. John Justice
John Justice was an honor student at Kenmore West
High School when he killed his family and a stranger in
1985.238 Justice stabbed his mother, father, and thirteenyear-old brother to death and then intentionally rear-ended
a car at a high speed in an alleged suicide attempt, killing
the driver of the other car.239 At trial, he was found not guilty
by reason of insanity in two of the deaths, and guilty of
manslaughter in the others.240 In 2005, Justice was released
from prison on parole, but within two years he returned to
prison for violating the conditions of his release by
threatening workers at a halfway house.241 After serving out
the remaining period of his 30-year prison sentence, Justice

234. Id.
235. People v. Trait, 527 N.Y.S.2d 920 (App. Div. 1988), appeal denied, 528
N.E.2d 908 (N.Y. 1988).
236. Id. at 921.
237. Matt Gryta, Trait’s First Lawyer Cites Faults of Decade Ago, BUFFALO
NEWS (June 6, 1989), https://buffalonews.com/1989/06/06/traits-first-lawyer-cites
-faults-of-decade-ago/.
238. Melinda Miller, Justice Released from Prison in 1985 Murders, but Gets
Civil Confinement, BUFFALO NEWS (Sept. 16, 2015) https://buffalonews.com/
2015/09/16/justice-released-from-prison-in-1985-murders-but-gets-civil-confine
ment/.
239. Id.
240. Id.
241. Id.
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was released from prison in September 2015.242
The state, however, successfully sought to confine
Justice civilly, on the ground that he remained dangerously
mentally ill.243 The civil confinement was based upon a
“recommitment order” issued pursuant to CPL § 330.20(14),
which allows for recommitment of the defendant to a
psychiatric facility if the court determines that the defendant
has a dangerous mental disorder.244 Interestingly, if Justice
had been found guilty of all of the murders, instead of not
guilty by reason of insanity with respect to two of the
murders, this statutory provision would not apply.245 The
Appellate Division affirmed the recommitment order,
concluding that Justice’s diagnosis of antisocial personality
disorder with narcissistic and paranoid features, coupled
with other testimony presented by the state regarding his
dangerousness, sufficiently demonstrated that Justice
suffered from a dangerous mental disorder requiring
commitment to a secure facility.246
E. Other New York Considerations
1. Competency under CPL Article 730
Before a defendant may raise an insanity defense at
trial, the defendant must be competent to stand trial. CPL
Article 730 governs competency proceedings. The defendant
is incompetent to stand trial if, as a result of mental disease
or defect, the defendant “lacks capacity to understand the

242. Id.
243. See id.; Casey Seiler, Civil Confinement of Killer Upheld on Appeal, TIMES
UNION (Feb. 18, 2016), https://www.timesunion.com/local/article/Civil-confine
ment-of-killer-upheld-on-appeal-6841098.php.
244. N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 330.20(14) (McKinney 2019); see also In re John
Z., 25 N.Y.S.3d 721, 722 (App. Div. 2016), appeal denied, 63 N.E.3d 71 (N.Y.
2016).
245. See In re John Z., 25 N.Y.S.3d at 722.
246. Id. at 723–26.
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proceedings against him or to assist in his own defense.”247
Competency is determined at the time of the criminal
proceedings, not the time of the crime. If the defendant is
determined to be incompetent to stand trial and has been
charged with a felony, the criminal action is suspended and
the defendant is committed to the custody of the Office of
Mental Health until he or she is no longer incapacitated, for
up to two-thirds of the maximum term of imprisonment, after
which a civil commitment proceeding may be commenced.248
2. Extreme Emotional Disturbance
A defendant charged with murder may raise an
affirmative defense that the defendant was “under the
influence of extreme emotional disturbance for which there
was a reasonable explanation or excuse, the reasonableness
of which is to be determined from the viewpoint of a person
in the defendant’s situation under the circumstances as the
defendant believed them to be.”249 If the defendant is
successful, the conviction is reduced to manslaughter in the
first degree.250 Like the insanity defense, the defense of
extreme emotional disturbance often involves the
presentation of expert psychiatric evidence, notice of which
is required pursuant to CPL § 250.10.251
In 2015, Court of Appeals upheld the conviction of a
defendant who had raised an extreme emotional disturbance
defense during his trial for murdering his ex-girlfriend and
her current partner.252 Expert testimony on the defense was
presented by both sides, but the jury rejected the defense
after deliberating for three hours.253 Additionally, the New
247. CRIM. PROC. § 730.10(1).
248. See generally CRIM. PROC. §§ 730.50, 730.60, 730.70.
249. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.25(1)(a); see also PENAL § 125.27(2)(a).
250. PENAL § 125.20(2).
251. See CRIM. PROC. § 250.10(1)(b).
252. People v. Pavone, 47 N.E.3d 56, 59 (N.Y. 2015).
253. See id. at 63.
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York State Legislature recently enacted legislation
abolishing the so-called “gay panic” and “trans panic”
defenses in the state, which previously allowed a homicide
defendant to claim extreme emotional disturbance based on
discovery or disclosure of the victim’s sexual orientation or
gender identity.254
3. Negating Mens Rea
In New York, the defendant may present evidence of a
mental disease or defect in an attempt to negate the intent
element of the charged crime. For example, if the defendant
is charged with murder, the defendant may argue that
because of a mental disease or defect, the defendant was
incapable of forming the intent to cause the death of the
victim.255 Unlike the insanity defense, which the defendant
has the burden to prove by a preponderance of the evidence,
if the defendant argues that a mental illness prevented him
or her from forming the required intent, the People are not
relieved of the burden to prove beyond a reasonable doubt
that the defendant could and did have the requisite intent.256
If the defendant is successful in using a mental illness to
negate the mens rea, the defendant could be acquitted
entirely, rather than confined in a psychiatric facility,
because the requisite intent is an element of the crime that
the People must prove in order to convict the defendant.257 A
defendant attempting to use psychiatric evidence of a mental
disease or defect to negate the mens rea must therefore give
proper notice under CPL § 250.10 and submit to the required
examinations.258

254. See 2019 N.Y. Sess. Law News 760–61 (McKinney) (L 2019, ch. 45).
255. See, e.g., PENAL § 125.25(1).
256. See generally People v. Segal, 429 N.E.2d 107, 110–11 (N.Y. 1981).
257. See id.
258. N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 250.10; see also Segal, 429 N.E.2d at 109.
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4. Mental Health Courts in New York
New York’s Mental Health Courts “seek to improve
safety, court operations, and the well-being of justiceinvolved individuals living with mental illness by linking
them
with
court-supervised,
community-based
treatment.”259 Eligibility criteria are based on the nature of
the criminal offense and the “nature and severity of a
person’s mental illness.”260 There are currently twenty-nine
mental health court locations, and the Buffalo and Rochester
areas have several mental health courts.261

259. Mental Health Courts: Overview, NYCOURTS, http://ww2.nycourts.gov/
mental-health-courts-overview-27066.
260. Mental Health Courts: Key Principles, NYCOURTS, http://ww2.nycourts
.gov/courts/problem_solving/mh/key_principles.shtml
261. Mental Health Courts: Court Locations, NYCOURTS, http://ww2.nycourts
.gov/courts/problem_solving/mh/courts.shtml; see also JOSEPHINE W. HAHN, CTR.
FOR CT. INNOVATION, NEW YORK STATE MENTAL HEALTH COURTS: A POLICY STUDY
2 (2015), https://www.courtinnovation.org/sites/default/files/documents/MHC%2
0Policy%20Study%20Report_Final.pdf.
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III. ADDITIONAL RELEVANT ISSUES
There are many additional issues that a discussion of the
insanity defense touches on that are beyond the scope of this
Article, but that an attorney or expert witness involved in an
insanity defense should be aware of. I will discuss them
briefly below, although this is by no means an exhaustive
list.
A. Is there a Constitutional Right to the Insanity Defense?
Eric Clark had a history of paranoid schizophrenia when
he shot and killed a police officer in 2000.262 At trial, Arizona
law prohibited him from presenting evidence regarding his
mental illness insofar as he wished to argue that he was
incapable of forming the necessary mens rea, and he was
found guilty during a bench trial after the court rejected his
alternative insanity defense.263 In 2006, the Supreme Court
rejected Clark’s contention that any particular articulation
of the insanity defense is constitutionally required by due
process.264 The Court also held that Arizona could
constitutionally preclude expert testimony on a diminished
capacity defense.265 The Supreme Court expressly left open
the issue whether the Constitution “mandates an insanity
defense.”266
In 2012, in Delling v. Idaho, the Supreme Court declined
the opportunity to address whether due process requires
states to allow some form of the insanity defense in criminal
cases.267 Idaho is one of four states that does not recognize
insanity as an affirmative defense, although it does allow

262. See Clark v. Arizona, 548 U.S. 735, 743–45 (2006).
263. Id. at 744–46.
264. Id. at 747–56.
265. Id. at 770–79.
266. Id. at 752 n.20; see also EWING, supra note 3, at 136–40 (discussing the
Clark case).
267. Delling v. Idaho, 568 U.S. 1038 (2012).
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expert evidence “on the issue of any state of mind which is
an element of the offense.”268 Over the dissent of Justices
Breyer, Ginsburg, and Sotomayor, the Supreme Court denied
certiorari, leaving the issue open for a future case.269
The Supreme Court largely resolved that issue in March
2020, with its decision in Kahler v. Kansas.270 In 2009, James
Kahler shot and killed his estranged wife, mother-in-law,
and two daughters.271 Kahler filed a motion challenging the
constitutionality of Kansas’ insanity statute.272 Kansas does
not recognize insanity as an affirmative defense but allows a
defendant to claim that, as a result of mental disease or
defect, the defendant “lacked the culpable mental state
required as an element of the crime charged.”273 The trial
court denied Kahler’s motion,274 leaving him unable to argue
that his inability to know right from wrong should excuse
him from criminal liability. Instead, Kahler unsuccessfully
argued at trial that his severe depression prevented him
from forming intent, and he was convicted of capital murder
and sentenced to death.275
After Kahler exhausted his state court appeals, the
Supreme Court granted certiorari in 2019.276 The Court
considered “whether the Due Process Clause requires States
to provide an insanity defense that acquits a defendant who
could not ‘distinguish right from wrong’ when committing his
crime, or, otherwise put, whether that Clause requires States
to adopt the moral-incapacity test from M’Naghten.”277 In an
268. IDAHO CODE § 18-207(1), (3) (2019).
269. Delling, 568 U.S. at 1038–39.
270. 140 S. Ct. 1021 (2020).
271. Id. at 1026–27.
272. Id. at 1027.
273. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-5209 (West 2011).
274. Kahler v. Kansas, 140 S. Ct. at 1027.
275. Id.
276. Kahler v. Kansas, 139 S. Ct. 1318 (2019).
277. Kahler v. Kansas, 140 S. Ct. at 1027.
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opinion by Justice Kagan, the Court held that the Due
Process Clause imposed no such requirement.278
Justice Kagan’s majority opinion largely focused on the
fact that the insanity defense varies among states and
throughout history.279 The Court reasoned that this
variation meant that no particular version of the insanity
defense could be deemed fundamental, such that it violated
due process for a state to formulate its defense differently.280
Inasmuch as the Court considered the Kansas statute an
alternative version of the insanity defense as opposed to an
abolition thereof,281 the Court held that the Kansas statute
was not unconstitutional.282 The Court observed that
“[d]efining the precise relationship between criminal
culpability and mental illness involves examining the
workings of the brain, the purposes of the criminal law, the
ideas of free will and responsibility,” and that this project
“should be open to revision over time.”283
Justice Breyer authored a dissenting opinion, joined by
Justices Ginsburg and Sotomayor.284 Justice Breyer would
have held that Kansas had unconstitutionally “eliminated
the core of a defense that has existed for centuries: that the
defendant, due to mental illness, lacked the mental capacity
necessary for his conduct to be considered morally
blameworthy.”285 The Kahler v. Kansas decision is a
fascinating read for any person interested in the origins and
history of the insanity defense.

278. Id. at 1025.
279. See id. at 1032–37.
280. See id. at 1037.
281. See id. at 1030–32.
282. Id. at 1037.
283. Id.
284. Id. at 1037 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
285. Id. at 1038.
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B. Increasing Incarceration of Mentally Ill Individuals
The deinstitutionalization movement that began in the
1950s was based, in part, on a benign motive: to treat mental
illness in the least restrictive setting, and to provide
individuals with mental illness the greatest possible amount
of autonomy.286 The abysmal conditions at many mental
institutions were also an alarming call to action.287
Policymakers at the time were also overly optimistic about
new psychotropic drugs and were attempting to decrease the
large cost burden that public psychiatric hospitals placed on
taxpayers.288
One estimate states that “approximately [ninety-two]
percent of the people who would have been living in public
psychiatric hospitals in 1955 were not living there in
1994.”289 Many of those who were deinstitutionalized were
severely mentally ill and were released into the community
without ensuring that medication, community integration
services, and other support those individuals needed would
be available to them.290 As a result, the nation’s population
of individuals in psychiatric hospitals has decreased
286. See E. FULLER TORREY, OUT OF THE SHADOWS: CONFRONTING AMERICA’S
MENTAL ILLNESS CRISIS (1997), excerpted in Deinstitutionalization: A Psychiatric
“Titanic,” PBS (May 10, 2005), https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/
asylums/special/excerpt.html.
287. See Richard D. Lyons, How Release of Mental Patients Began, N.Y. TIMES
(Oct. 30, 1984), https://www.nytimes.com/1984/10/30/science/how-release-ofmental-patients-began.html; Ana Swanson, A shocking number of mentally ill
Americans end up in prison instead of treatment, WASH. POST (Apr. 30, 2015),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2015/04/30/a-shocking-numberof-mentally-ill-americans-end-up-in-prisons-instead-of-psychiatric-hospitals.
288. See Thomas L. Hafemeister et al., Forging Links and Renewing Ties:
Applying the Principles of Restorative and Procedural Justice to Better Respond
to Criminal Offenders with a Mental Disorder, 60 BUFF. L. REV. 147, 167–69
(2012); see also Lyons, supra note 287.
289. TORREY, supra note 286; see also Hafemeister et al., supra note 288, at 168
(stating that in the mid-1950s, approximately 559,000 individuals were receiving
care in these facilities, but by 2012, that number had dropped to 40,000).
290. TORREY, supra note 286; Hafemeister et al., supra note 288, at 168; Lyons,
supra note 287.
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exponentially, but the incarceration of mentally ill
individuals has rapidly increased.291 The population of the
mentally ill in the nation’s prisons and jails is difficult to
quantify, and statistics vary, but the Department of Justice
estimated that in 2005, “more than half of all prison and jail
inmates had a mental health problem,”292 including less
severe diagnoses. Some recent estimates state that
approximately fifteen percent of inmates have a “severe”
mental illness.293
C. Execution of Mentally Ill Persons
Internationally, there is strong opposition to executing
people with severe mental illness.294 The United Nations, the
European Union, the Council of Europe, and the InterAmerican Commission on Human Rights have all taken
positions
accordingly.295
Most
Americans
agree;
approximately two-thirds of Americans polled expressed
opposition to executing severely mentally ill people.296 Exact
statistics are not available, but some organizations estimate
that approximately twenty percent of individuals on death
row have a severe mental illness.297 In 2006, the American
Psychiatric Association, the American Psychological
Association, the National Alliance on Mental Health, and the
American Bar Association all adopted a policy opposing the
291. See TORREY, supra note 286; Lisa W. Foderaro, The Mentally Ill
Overwhelm New York’s Prisons, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 6, 1994), https://www.nytimes
.com/1994/10/06/us/the-mentally-ill-overwhelm-new-york-s-prisons.html;
Swanson, supra note 287.
292. DORIS J. JAMES & LAUREN E. GLAZE, BUREAU OF JUST. STATS., U.S. DEP’T OF
JUST., MENTAL HEALTH PROBLEMS OF PRISON AND JAIL INMATES 1 (2006),
https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/mhppji.pdf.
293. A.B.A. DEATH PENALTY PROJ., supra note 13, at 15. In 2000, the American
Psychiatric Association estimated that one in five prisoners were “seriously
mentally ill.” Hafemeister et al., supra note 288, at 150 n.7, 171 n.101.
294. A.B.A. DEATH PENALTY PROJ., supra note 13, at 4.
295. Id.
296. Id.
297. Id. at 16.
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death penalty for defendants who suffered from severe
mental illness at the time of their crime.298 Thus far, no
jurisdictions with the death penalty have adopted a
categorical exclusion for the severely mentally ill.299
D. Community Intervention Programs
Community intervention programs have been developed
to attempt to reduce the incarceration and recidivism of
mentally ill individuals involved with the criminal justice
system. One such model is the Assertive Community
Treatment [hereinafter “ACT”] model.300 ACT programs
arose in the 1970s and utilize mobile treatment teams that
provide services like housing assistance, addiction
treatment, and employment assistance.301 Rochester’s
Forensic Assertive Community Treatment, or R-FACT
model, was developed at the University of Rochester. By
targeting risk factors and using “legal leverage,” this model
has been effective in reducing jail time and increasing
engagement in outpatient treatment.302
Another program, Transitions Clinic Network, employs
former prisoners as community health workers to assist
people leaving prison in dealing with medical, psychiatric,
and substance abuse disorders.303 The program is rapidly
298. Id. at 1.
299. Id. Some state legislatures, however, have considered creating such an
exclusion. See Resources on Severe Mental Illness and the Death Penalty,
AMERICANBAR.ORG (Apr. 21, 2020), https://www.americanbar.org/groups/crsj/proj
ects/death_penalty_due_process_review_project/serious-mental-illness-initiative
-/resources0/.
300. Robert L. Weisman, J. Steven Lamberti, & J. Richard Ciccone,
Community-Based Interventions for Justice-Involved Individuals with Serious
Mental Disorders, reprinted in RICHARD ROSNER & CHARLES SCOTT, PRINCIPLES
AND PRACTICE OF FORENSIC PSYCHIATRY 895 (3d ed. 2016).
301. Id.
302. See id. at 895–96
303. Patricia Leigh Brown, They’re Out of Prison. Can They Stay Out of the
Hospital?, N.Y. TIMES (May 29, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/05/29/
health/ex-prisoners-health-california.html.
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growing, doubling in size over the past five years, and it now
has twenty-five health centers in eleven states and Puerto
Rico.304 These are only two of the many community
intervention programs doing similar work throughout the
nation.

304. Id.
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CONCLUSION
The madness that is insanity is found across a wide
spectrum of behavior. This is why the law struggles with
defining the defense. It is a noble intellectual effort to
prevent punishing a person for acts that are a product of
disease. The disease of mental illness, however, can be
difficult to objectively measure. Its subjective nature has
consistently undermined public support for the insanity
defense. Cancer cannot be faked, but insanity can . . . or so
the argument goes.
Reporter Mac McClelland perhaps encapsulated the
influence of public perception on the insanity defense best
with this quote from her 2017 New York Times article, When
“Not Guilty” Is a Life Sentence:
Perhaps the most cleareyed view of the compromises inherent in
[not guilty by reason of insanity] commitments comes from Paul
Appelbaum, professor and director of the division of law, ethics and
psychiatry at Columbia University. Appelbaum acknowledges that
some [defendants found not guilty by reason of insanity] are
“unnecessarily detained for a longer period than what seems to be
warranted by their mental disorder and its impact on their
likelihood of being violent in the future.” But, he says, such
exaggerated concerns about public safety may be necessary to the
survival of the insanity defense. “There are injustices that are
imposed on individuals,” Appelbaum says. “But I also see at a
30,000-foot level why the system works that way, and recognize
perhaps the paradox that if it didn’t work that way, we might lose
the insanity defense altogether, or at the very least have an even
more restrictive system that we have to deal with.”305

The defendant in the 1847 Freeman case discussed above
was represented by future Governor of New York and
Secretary of State William Seward.306 During his closing
argument, Seward had this to say about the insanity defense:
We labor under the further embarrassment that the plea of
insanity is universally suspected. It is the last subterfuge of the
guilty, and so is too often abused. But however obnoxious to

305. McClelland, supra note 6.
306. Hawkins-Leon, supra note 128, at 440.
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suspicion this defense is, there have been cases where it was true;
and when true it is of all pleas the most perfect and complete
defense that can be offered in any human tribunal. 307

Many members of the public indeed view the insanity
defense as the last subterfuge of the guilty. The insanity
defense, however, is used far less often than many people
believe, and is even less often successful.308
The public imagination is easily inflamed by the insanity
defense. That is because the acts that lead to criminal
charges are often horrific. It is an ongoing challenge for our
criminal justice system to separate acts that are a
consequence of disease from those that arise from criminal
intent. The challenge can only be met by judging each case
individually, on its own unique set of facts.

307. Id.
308. Recently, a committee of the New York State Bar Association reviewed
the history of New York’s insanity defense and recommended the study of
potential legislative changes to the defense and to the confinement of insanity
acquittees. See Liberati-Conant & Shea, supra note 9, at 28. The conclusions and
recommendations made in that report are beyond the scope of this Article, but
New York’s insanity defense, as it has in the past, will undoubtedly be amended
in the future.

